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PRODUCTS LIABILITY: METHODS OF PLEADING
AND PROOF FOR THE PLAINTIFF
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of products liability was for many years burdened with
traditional concepts of fault and contracts. These concepts, begin-
ning with such foundations of the common law as the old tort concept
of action on the case and "privity" of contract, reinforced the now
long deceased commercial principle of caveat emptor. Buyers were
precluded from recovering unless, for example, an affirmative
misrepresentation had been made,' or the injured party stood in
a direct contractual relationship with the seller of the article. 2 In-
deed, the general principles of "privity" found in such early cases
as Win terbottom v. Wright3 have survived into the twentieth cen-
tury.4
From these early theories there has emerged a definable body
of law through which the manufacturer and seller of a defective
article can be reached. Three theories are now recognized: war-
ranty, negligence and strict liability. Warranty presently consists of
two forms, that of common law warranty and the warranties found
in the Uniform Commercial Code. Negligence exists largely as it
did decades ago, the primary concern being negligent manufacture.
Of the three theories, strict liabililty is the most recent and is now
found to be imposed, in most states using it, irrespective of any
warranties, usually on the theory that the product is unreasonably
dangerous to the user.
Although these are presently separate theories, vestiges of the
past still remain in many states, while in others decisions have in-
terchanged and cross-bred portions of these three theories. The re-
sult is that the course of development of these separate theories
has been slowed if not altered altogether.5
This note will examine the problems of pleading and proof of
1. Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N.E. 481 (1908).
2. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009, 1010 (1915).
3. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex. 415 (1842).
4. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REv. 1225 (1937).
5. See 2 L. FRuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODuCrs LiABmrTY §§ 16.04 and 16A (Supp.
1970). This list includes those states that have, in some fashion, adopted strict liability
in either warranty, tort or a combination of both.
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the three theories of products liability and will suggest practical
solutions to these problems in the form of pleading requirements.
Suggestions for plaintiff's proof at the trial stage will also be made.
The thrust of this note is largely practical, its purpose being to
guide the practitioner in the commencement of a suit. Because of
the general nature of such a note, it is difficult to take more than
passing account of such collateral problems as defenses and choice
of parties. These areas will be discussed only insofar as they affect
the primary topic.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
To recover under any of the theories of liability, the plaintiff
will have the burden of alleging and proving (1) that he was in-
jured by the product,6 (2) that the injury was the result of a de-
fective or unreasonably unsafe product 7 and (3) that the defect
existed when the product left the control of the manufacturer.8 To
these allegations there must then be joined the allegation (and even-
tually, proof) of all the elements of the particular liability theory.
In this last respect the products liability suit will resemble any
other lawsuit. Thus, if the foundation of the suit is negligence, all
the elements of actionable negligence must be pleaded along with
the three basic elements mentioned above. If the suit is grounded
on the theory of warranty, the plaintiff must show the existence of
the warranty and its breach, plus the three basic elements. This
dual concept of pleading and proof is essential to both the lawsuit
itself and an understanding of the problems discussed below.
Uncertainty in pleading and proof of the products liability case
results from (1) confusion in the substantive law upon which the
pleadings are necessarily based and (2) the fact that the three
basic elements mentioned above are necessary for a suit no matter
which theory is utilized. 9 Thus the proof of these elements will
apply to any liability theory. A short history of the development of
the substantive law should help to explain the first source of con-
fusion.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Some of the earliest American cases of products liability were
those holding that a seller of food warrants to his customers that
the food is fit to eat.10 This doctrine of "warranty" requiring a
6. W. PWSSER, LAW OF TORTS 671 (4th ed. 1971).
7. Id. at 672.
8. Id. at 672.
9. Id. at 671.
10. Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns 768 (N.Y. 1815).
contractual relationship between the producer and injured user was
later saddled with exceptions that did away with the requirement
of privity of contract. The most important exception was that es-
tablished in Thomas v. Winchester" and later applied to firearms
and explosives. Thomas held that privity need not exist when the
product is "inherently dangerous." Judge Cardozo's opinion in the
famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor C0. 2 established yet
another exception to the privity requirement which applied to pro-
ducts that created an "unreasonable risk of harm."
The 1950's saw a great extension of a strict, privity-free "war-
ranty." The first case involved a grinding wheel which killed an
employee of a subpurchaser.1 3 Thereafter it was extended to cos-
metics and drugs. 14 The real breakthrough came in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 5 in which the rules of privity, reliance
and disclaimer were all forsaken. A new rule was made holding
the manufacturer of any product likely to be dangerously defec-
tive, to strict, privity-free "warranty" liability.
All this time the courts had been moving toward a strict lia-
bility theory within the framework of warranty. The label of "war-
ranty" hung on until the publication of Prosser's second edition of
Torts in which he suggested that the courts abandon the much used
limitation to food and impose "strict liability outright in tort. . .."16
The decision representing the most obvious shift to Prosser's
viewpoint of strict liability in tort was that of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc . 7 This case involved an injury from a poorly
made lathe. The defendant contended that the plaintiff failed to give
notice of the defect as was then required by the Uniform Sales Act.
Speaking for the court, Justice Traynor stated that the law of sales
was not applicable to the situation and that the manufacturer was
to be held strictly liable in tort.' 8
It can be seen from this brief history of major decisions that
11. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
12. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
13. Divello v. Gardner Machine Co., 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. 1951).
14. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
15. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
16. W. PaossER, LAW OF TORTS 510 (2d ed. 1955).
17. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
18. The position taken by the court in Greenman and later cases adopting the form of
strict liability as found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) has not, unfor-
tunately, been adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court. In Christensen v. Osakis
Silo Co., 424 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1970), the plaintiff sought an instruction to the Jury
that could have included Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing with the lower court that such was not the state
law in North Dakota.
The current state law seems to be that privity is no longer needed in an action
against a manufacturer based on implied warranty or negligence. However, a waiver of
the warranty may be affected and for this reason the cases relied on by the plaintiff in
Olwritenaen were not based on strict liability.
NOTES 107
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the uncertainty in the substantive differences between warranty and
strict liability is not totally unfounded. One theory grew from the
other, each disregarding fault as a basis for liability. Further con-
fusion resulted from the introduction of statutory warranties under
the Uniform Sales Act19 and the Uniform Commercial Code.20 Al-
though common law implied warranties differ materially from
those under the U.C.C., this distinction has not been made clear by
some of the courts that have used "warranty" terms when dealing
with strict liability. "Warranty" has generally come to be identified
with contracts for sale under the U.C.C. While there is nothing in
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) to pre-
clude such a construction, the differences between these two war-
ranties should be understood. Under the Restatement (Second) the
consumer is not affected by limitations on the scope and content
of the warranties, nor is he required to give notice of breach. The
plaintiff's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract with the seller and is not affected by disclaimers.21 How-
ever, even the coverage under the U.C.C. has been extended to
more closely approximate strict liability. The broadest alternative
to section 2-318 now extends warranty remedies ". . . to any per-
son who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods . . ." without the limitation that the injured party
be a member of the purchaser's household or a guest. 22
B. THE TRI-ELEMENT REQUIREMENT
The real impact of the similarities between the two theories be-
comes even clearer when it is remembered that the same three
proof requirements apply to all three liability theories. The result
is that proof of a prima facie case in warranty will often result
in a prima facie case under strict liability. When the theory of the
action is negligence, the same proof used in warranty and strict
liability will likely constitute circumstantial evidence of sufficient
weight to make a case for the jury in negligence. This is true
whether the end result is reached by the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur or a similar theory.23
III. RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND "DEFECTIVENESS"
In products liability law there is much difference of opinion be-
tween courts as to the kind or quantum of evidence necessary to
19. UNIFORM SALES ACT H§ 12-15.
20. UNIWORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402A, comment i at 356 (1965).
22. North Dakota has adopted this wording. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-35 (1968).
28. W. PRoesser, LAW OF TORTS 672 (4th ed. 1971).
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make out a prima facie case. The divergence of opinion centers
around the degree to which the plaintiff must prove "defectiveness"
of the product causing the injury. Three approaches are taken by
the courts to this problem. The first and more traditional was to
require direct proof of the defect through real evidence and expert
testimony. 24 The second approach, taken by many courts today, is
to infer a defect from the circumstantial evidence presented.25 The
inference may be accomplished by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
though some courts make the same inference but leave the method
unlabeled.2 6 The third approach to the proof of "defectiveness"
problem is to require no proof of defect at all but only require a
showing that the product did not perform as expected. 27 As proof
by direct evidence is generally well understood, only inference by
res ipsa loquitur and the "non proof" method will be covered here.
A. PROVING DEFECTIVENESS BY RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The rule or doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, while applicable to
negligence cases generally, is particularly well suited to products
liability cases because of the difficulty of proving the existence of
a defect except by the use of circumstantial evidence. Thus, when
an injury from a product occurs, manufactured by a party who
had "exclusive control" of the product, res ipsa will provide an in-
ference that it was the manufacturer's defective product that caus-
ed the injury. 2 The confusion and resulting conflict in decisions
arises when res ipsa is applied to theories other than negligence
and to cases in which the fact situations fall outside of the require-
ments for the rule's application. 29
The procedural effect of the use of res ipsa loquitur varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The least weight given to the doctrine is
that of a permissive inference of negligence. This is enough to avoid
a non-suit or dismissal but not enough to entitle the plaintiff to a
24. Scientific Supply Co. v. Zelinger, 139 Colo. 568, 341 P.2d 897 (1959).
25. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969).
26. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber Inc., 252 Iowa 1280, 110
N.W.2d 449 (1961).
27. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 I. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
28. Pleading sufficient facts to satisfy the res ipsa method of proving a defect will
usually satisfy the re8 ipsa requirements necessary to prove negligence. 1 L. FRUMER
AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1203[9][d] (1971).
29. Prosser states these requirements to be:
(1) The accident must be a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone's negligence.
(2) The accident must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the control of the defendant.
(3) The accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or con-
tribution by the plaintiff.
W. PRossEa, LAw Os TORTS 214 (4th ed. 1971).
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directed verdict. The jury may accept the inference but is not com-
pelled to do so.80
A presumption gives the plaintiff a greater advantage in that
if the defendant does not produce sufficient evidence to the con-
trary, the jury must find for the plaintiff. The "burden of going
forward" is on the defendant, but if he presents evidence equal to
the plaintiff's, the plaintiff must lose. 81
The greatest weight given to res ipsa is to put on the defend-
ant the ultimate burden of proof. This means that the defendant
is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
negligence did not cause the accident.3 2 It is apparent that in cases
collected and classified by Prosser in The Procedural Effect of Res
Ipsa Loquitur83 the majority of states are found to be heavily in
favor of the permissive inference.
The theory that the plaintiff should have the lightest burden of
proof was carried to something of an extreme in the recent Oregon
case of Vanek v. Kirby.3 4 In that case, the court held that the
plaintiff, a passenger in the defendant's car who was injured when
the car left the road, had stated a cause of action against the
manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty of merchantibility.
The plaintiff had alleged that "[s]aid vehicle could not be kept
on said highway during its normal use as a vehicle for transpor-
tation."3 5 The trial court had entered a judgment on the pleadings
for the defendant and the Supreme Court reversed on appeal.
On appeal, the issue was the sufficiency of the complaint. The
court found that the complaint was sufficient if it would adequately
inform the defendant that the plaintiff was relying only upon the
defective mechanism in the vehicle. Referring to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, though this was not a negligence case, the court
found "no greater reason for imposing upon the plaintiff the neces-
sity of proving a specific defect in the present case than for im-
posing upon the plaintiff in a res ipsa case the necessity of prov-
ing a specific act of negligence. .... ,,6 Recognizing that the de-
fendant might have a hard time preparing a defense from the com-
plaint, the court alluded to Oregon's liberal rules of discovery as
a solution.
30. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 Mnew. L. Rv. 241, 244
(1936).
31. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIENCE § 2490, at 286 (3rd ed. 1940).
32. 4 3. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2485, at 270 (3rd ed. 1940).
33. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa o Loquitur, 20 MixN. L. REv. 241 (1936).
84. Vanek v. Kirby, 450 P.2d 778 (Ore. 1969).
35. Id. at 780.
36. Id. at 782.
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B. Res Ipsa Loquitur's REQUIREMENT OF CONTROL IN PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY CASES
While Vanek may reach the outer limits of the use of res ipsa
in pleadings, it is also a liberal decision as to the satisfaction of
one of the requirements underlying the very application of the doc-
trine: the requirement that the defendant be in "exclusive control"
of the article causing the injury. The Vanek case serves as an ex-
cellent example of the confusion resulting from this requirement.
This requirement, which lies at the heart of the res ipsa doctrine,
forms the biggest distinction between negligence cases in which
res ipsa is usually applied and products liability cases.
In negligence cases, the defendant's control of the instrument
makes it highly unlikely that the plaintiff could have caused his
injury and more likely that it resulted from the defendant's negli-
gence. But in products liability cases, the plaintiff is usually in con-
trol of the device that caused his injury and the defendant manu-
facturer is removed. Still, the spirit of the control requirement is
more applicable in some products liability cases than in others. In
cases involving either exploding or contaminated bottles, the plain-
tiff's control is negligible even though he has possession.3 7 Because
the product is sealed and because the plaintiff's relationship to the
bottle is a passive one, there is little to suggest that the plaintiff
would cause it to explode or cause a mouse to appear in the bottom.39
The control differences are not material.3 9
The situation in Vanek was quite different. In that case, the
injuring article was an automobile directly in the control of the
plaintiff. The fact that a car leaves the road does not make it
more likely than not that the movement was caused by the de-
fendant's fault rather than the plaintiff's. Experience tells us the
opposite. Thus, the primary reason for the inference does not seem
to appear in cases like Vanek.
The "exclusive control" requirement for the use of res ipsa has
also been somewhat relaxed in cases where it is impossible for
the plaintiff to prove which of two or more defendants is respon-
sible for the injury-producing defect. In such situations there are a
growing number of decisions which permit the injured plaintiff to
show (1) that he was injured in the kind of accident that does
not ordinarily occur without negligence; (2) that he did not con-
tribute to the injury; (3) that one or the other of the defendants
37. For an excellent discussion of a plaintiff's relationship to a bottle, see Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
38. Ritter v. Coca Cola Co. (Kenosha-Racine) Inc., 24 Wis. 2d 157, 128 N.W.2d 439
(1964).
39. But see 2 L. FRaUmER AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITry § 22.0113][b] (1970).
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was in control of the product at the time. The plaintiff can then
join the defendants in the same suit and get the case to the jury
against each defendant on the issue of negligence. In Dement v.
Olin-Mathisen Chemical Corporation" the plaintiff was injured by
the premature explosion of a dynamite charge. The components of
the charge were gelatine explosive, a booster and an electrical
blasting cap. The court reversed the trial court's holding that
res ipsa loquitur could be used as a basis for recovery, saying:
Nor is it necessary here that in order for res ipsa to apply
one particular force must be severed out, identified and
held as a matter of law to be the cause of the premature
explosion. . . . Here from a physical standpoint the injury
was caused by a combination of the three products. Where
the consequences are so devastating and the risk to human
life so great, manufacturers of products which are compo-
nents designed to be used with other known products may
not thus evade the responsibility to come in and explain.
That is basically what the res ipsa doctrine requires.4 1
While the application of res ipsa in cases like Vanek and Dement
has been called "a severe blow to the theoretical integrity of res
ipsa loquitur"42 and may result in the imposition of liability upon
a non-negligent person, Prosser has denounced the term "exclusive
control" as "misleading and pernicious. 4 3 He points out that there
are many cases in which physical control rests with someone other
than the defendant, such as his agent" or his lessee.4 5 A better
solution, says Prosser, is to abandon the term as a poor choice of
words and say merely that "the apparent cause of the accident
must be such that the defendant would be responsible for any neg-
ligence connected with it."' "4
The problems of the application of the doctrine which have
been discussed arise from the significance attached to the "control
requirement" and from the implications attached to the English
translation of the phrase, i.e., that "the thing speaks for itself."
Is the importance attached to these two aspects of the doctrine of
sufficient weight to justify a refusal to use the doctrine in the
products liability case where the defendant has no control of the
injuring instrument and in cases founded on theories other than
40. Dement v. Olin-Mathisen Chemical Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960).
41. Id. at 82-83.
42. Note, Pr oof of Defect in a Strict Product Liabiliy case, 22 MAxs L. REv. 189
(1970).
43. Prosser, Rea lysa Loquitur n Califor isa, 37 CALir. L. RPv. 183 (1949).
44. Waddle v. Loges, 52 Cal. App. 2d 115, 125 P.2d 914 (1942).
45. Du Val v. Boos Bros. Cafeteria Co., 45 Cal. App. 377, 187 P. 767 (1919).
46. Prosser, Res 1psa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. Rzv. 183, 201 (1949).
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negligence? A short look at the history of the doctrine tells us that
it is not.
When Byrne v. Boadle, ' the original res ipsa case was tried,
a question arose as to the necessity of affirmative proof of negli-
gence by the defendant. At this time it was Baron Pollock who used
the familiar Latin phrase. As many writers have pointed out, Pol-
lock used no witchcraft to make the phrase applicable, only common
sense.4'
Nor does the "requirement" of "exclusive control" hold any
mystical meaning. Indeed, the "requirement" was borrowed from
Wigmore's formula which was an attempt to define and codify what
he found in the cases in which the doctrine had been applied. As
Wigmore put it in 1905: "Both inspection and user must have been
at the time of the injury in the control of the party charged.' 9 4
With catch words such as those cited above, the reasoning and
common sense mental processes behind res ipsa were reduced to
the "formula" and "requirements" that most courts now apply. A
strict interpretation of the doctrine will ignore the fact that the
same inferences of liability in a negligence suit may apply to
identical or similar fact situations in the warranty or strict liabil-
ity suit. A strict interpretation of "exclusive control" will likewise
limit the plaintiff and preclude his recovery under res ipsa in cases
like Vanek. The plaintiff in the products liability case can only
suffer from a strict interpretation of the doctrine.
C. PROOF OF DEFECTIVENESS WITHOUT PROOF OF DEFECT
Although they are still definitely in the minority, a line of cases
has developed in which nothing more than the happening of the
accident has been introduced to prove a defect. 50 The landmark
decision among these cases is Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg.
Co.5 1 In that case the plaintiff was struck in the eye by a chip
off the edge of a claw hammer. A jury verdict was returned
holding both the manufacturer and the wholesaler strictly liable for
the plaintiff's injury.
The decision is significant in that it is not a case where the
injuring instrument can't be produced or where it is totally de-
stroyed. In Dunham each party offered expert testimony and test-
ed the hammer thoroughly but the plaintiff was unable to produce
any evidence of a defect. In affirming, the court found that:
47. Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. and C. 772, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
48. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALiP. L. REv. 183, 185 (1949).
49. 4 J. WIGMOPB, EVIDENCE § 2509 (1st ed. 1905).
50. See note 81 inlra.
51. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
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[a]lthough the definitions of the term "defect" in the con-
text of products liability law use varying language, all of
them rest upon the common premise that those products
are defective which are dangerous because they fail to per-
form in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of
their nature and intended function.
52
The thrust of this decision and others like it is that the plaintiff
no longer has to comply with one of the three basic elements
of proof required under all three liability theories. He must no
longer show proof of a specific defect. He need only show that
the product failed to "perform in the manner that would reasonably
have been expected. . . -53 The jury would then be entitled to
infer a defect from the happening of the accident.
IV. PLEADING THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
To decide what theories counsel for the plaintiff should plead
or how the theories should be pleaded, the substantive law must,
of course, be carefully scrutinized. Listed below are points concern-
ing the substantive law that should be kept in mind in order
to avoid confusion in the complaint.
1. Strict liability and common law warranty may be so
similar that pleading one theory will cover both
Again, because common law warranty was the precursor to
strict liability under the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 402A,
there is little substantive difference. The theories are essentially
the same and often nothing is gained by separate counts. In states
where the Restatement is followed, common law warranty should
be stricken from the complaint.
2. There is a difference between common law warranty
and warranties available under the U. C. C.
These differences include the statute of limitations period, dis-
claimers, measure of damages, timely notice, the raising of a
duty by the seller's words and conduct and reliance upon the
warranty.
3. The case law of the jurisdiction may allow the plaintiff
to plead res ipsa loquitur in warranty and strict liability
52. Id. at 342, 247 N.E.2d at 403.
53. Id. at 344, 247 N.E.2d at 403.
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Where this is allowed, the plaintiff will be able to show a
defective product by pleading the general res ipsa requirements,
though the pleading examples given below will usually satisfy even
the strictest requirements for factual pleading of a defect. In using
res ipsa in cases based on negligence, counsel should determine
whether the jurisdiction allows him to plead specific acts of negli-
gence as well as the general doctrine of res ipsa.5 4 If permitted,
it is considered better practice to plead both.5
4. The plaintiff should join all relevant theories and parties
Where the joinder rules are liberal enough, the plaintiff should
join all potential grounds for recovery in a single action against
all persons potentially liable. Thus, claims in negligence and strict
liability against the manufacturer should be joined with claims
of warranty against the seller.
5. Defenses should be anticipated
This is particularly true when using the negligence theory either
alone or when joined with other theories, as it opens the plaintiff
up to claims of contributory negligence.
Keeping in mind that the pleading requirements will vary from
state to state depending upon such things as the use that can be
made of res ipsa loquitur and the differences between warranty
and strict liability, the following requirements are those that gen-
erally need to be pleaded under negligence, strict liability and
warranty. Where important distinctions occur, they are noted.
B. PLEADING NEGLIGENCE
1. Duty of care of the defendant
The complaint must show a legal duty on the part of the
defendant to exercise some sort of care toward the person injured.
The duty is generally found .by reasoning backward from the facts
alleging the injury. The duty must then follow as a matter of law.56
Usually a manufacturer's duty is: to exercise reasonable care in
manufacturing, construction and design so that the product will
be reasonably safe for the purpose or use intended;57 to make
reasonable tests and inspections to discover defects; and to warn
54. 8 L. FRUrMER AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LiALmrTy § 46.0212](c] (1970).
55. Fiedler, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Products Liability Cases, ABA INS., NEG., AND
COMP. LAW SECrION 191, 194 (1966).
56. Southwest Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Northern, 65 Ariz. 172, 177 P.2d 219, 221
(1947).
57. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 644 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 398 (1965).
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of any dangers inherent in a perfectly made product.5 8 It must
also be shown that the duties were owed to the party injured
and that the injury was foreseeable. In these respects the suit
is like other ordinary suits in negligence.
2. Circumstances of injury
This allegation is used primarily to help form a sufficient factual
basis from which negligence can be inferred by using res ipsa
loquitur.
3. Breach of duty or negligent act by the defendant
The breach may be failure to reasonably design, construct or
manufacture. A failure to warn is also a breach and makes the
product "defective." It is here that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
may be invoked if the plaintiff is without sufficient knowledge
to allege specific acts of negligence. Whether or not a complaint
sufficiently alleges negligence and the effect of the use of res ipsa
are, of course, governed by the usual rules of pleading negligence
in the particular state.
4. Defendant's knowledge
As defendant's lack of due care is a specific requirement of
negligence, the plaintiff must likewise allege that the defendant
knew or should have known that an injury would result.
5. The product reached the plaintiff without any material
change
This requirement, called "tracing," is necessary in order to
help prove lack of negligence on the part of a third party handier
or carrier.59
6. Existence of a defect
Although res ipsa may reduce the need of alleging specific
acts of negligence, the plaintiff must always show that either these
acts or the negligence imputed to the defendant resulted in a
defective product.
7. Plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence
The general rules of pleading negligence control here as to
58. Johnson v. West Fargo Mfg. Co., 255 Minn. 19, 95 N.W.2d 497, 501 (1959).
59. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 159 P.2d 436 (1944),
the court logically concluded that the plaintiff may show the defendant's control of the
Instrument only after he has shown that it reached the plaintiff without a change in
condition.
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whether such an allegation is a matter for the defense to plead.
Generally, the plaintiff need not plead it.6°
8. The defective product was the proximate cause of the
injury
The allegation of proximate cause is also covered by the general
rules of pleading negligence.6 1
C. PLEADING STRICT LiABILrrY
1. The defendant placed upon the market a product in
a defective condition which was unreasonably danger-
ous to the user
In making this allegation, it is usually sufficient if the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant placed upon the market an unreasonably
dangerous product, plus a description of what happened, (e.g., the
bottle blew up, the steering failed, etc.). In many cases the plaintiff
will not know what the specific defect was, but in most states a
general allegation is sufficient for the pleading stage. It is also nec-
essary to allege here that the product was defective when placed on
the market by the defendant. While the plaintiff must always plead
and prove a defect in strict liability, what constitutes an "unreason-
ably dangerous" product,62 is determined only on a case by case
basis. Included under this term have been cinder building blocks,63
and paper cups. 64 Finally, it should not be alleged that the defendant
should have known about the defect. A lack of due care is immaterial
to a case founded on strict liability and should be confined to neg-
ligence cases.65
2. The defendant was engaged in the business of selling
the product
Selling or "seller" is the language used in Section 402A. This
clearly applies to manufacturers as there are sales involved with
the distribution of their products to retailers. It has, in at least one
case also been extended to rentals.66
60. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 194. (1960).
61. Pulley v. Pacific Coca Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wash. 2d 728, 415 P.2d 636 (1966).
62. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958).
63. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 181. So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1966).
64. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965); Dickerson, Products iMabitity: How Good Does
a Product Have To Be, 42 IND. L.J. 801 (1967).
65. See Pulley v. Pacific Coca Cola Bottling Co., 68 Wash. 2d 728, 415 P.2d 636
(1966).
66. Citrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965) ; it should also be noted that this language does not exclude a third person who
is not the original buyer from recovering. Comment 1 to § 402A of the RESTATEMENT
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3. When the defendant placed the product on the market,
he knew or should have known that it would be used
without inspection for defects
Although this element is not required by Section 402A, it is set
forth in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.67 This element
is easily inferred from the facts in most cases.
4. The plaintiff was using the product in a reasonably fore-
seeable manner
The purpose of this requirement is clear, as use in an unforeseen
manner is a good defense to strict liability. In the pleadings it should
be sufficient to state how the product was being used.
5. The defect in the product was a substantial factor in
causing injury to the plaintiff
The only caution here is that "proximate cause" should be avoid-
ed as that term usually applies to actions founded on negligence.68
6. The plaintiff was a user or consumer of the product
If the plaintiff was a user or consumer, this should be pleaded,
as many jurisdictions have not yet determined whether strict liabil-
ity protection extends to "innocent bystanders." A leading case hold-
ing that warranty, equated by the court to tort liability, extended
to a bystander, is Mitchell v. Miller,6 9 where a car with a defec-
tive transmission rolled from a country club parking lot and hit a
a golfer. As the Restatement (Second) expresses no opinion as to
whether Section 402A should apply in such cases,7 0 counsel must be
careful to ascertain the case law of the forum and include other
possible theories.
7. Injuries sustained and damages
D. PLEADING WARRANTY
Before entering a claim in warranty, counsel must decide what
advantages are to be gained over a remedy in tort. If warranty is
decided upon, the question is then one of choosing between common
(SEoON) oP TORTS (1965) points out that the plaintiff may be a donee of the original
purchaser.
67. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
68. The distinction between causation in fact and proximate cause should be kept in
mind. Proximate cause deals only with the question of whether the cause was so im-
mediate that the defendant should be held legally responsible.
69. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Sup. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965); in this regard, see
generally Noel, Defective Prodtuts: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN.
L. R v. 1 (1970).
70. RESTACEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment o Caveat (1965).
NoTEs
law warranty and those provided under the U.C.C. This decision is
usually determined by the facts. Since common law warranty re-
quirements would be satisfied by pleading strict liability, only those
allegations necessary under the U.C.C. have been included below.
1. Existence of a warranty
Plaintiff should first allege the facts upon which the warranty
arises (e.g., express representations of fact). He should also be sure
to identify the type of warranty relied upon.
2. Breach of warranty
This allegation is nothing more than the traditional statement
that the product was defective when it was placed on the market
by the defendant.
3. The defect in the product was the cause of the plaintiff's
injury
4. Reliance by the plaintiff
Although reliance on the warranty is generally no longer needed,
when the warranty is an express warranty for a particular purpose
the plaintiff must have relied upon the seller's skill and judgment."1
5. The plaintiff is a purchaser of the product or could
reasonably be expected to use it
This allegation will depend upon which form of Section 2-318 of
the Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted.
6. Notice to the defendant of breach of warranty7 2
7. Injuries and damages
V. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF PROVING THE PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY CASE
One of the distinguishing features of the products liability case
is the amount of preparation for trial that counsel must undertake.
The proof is usually highly technical, the stakes high, and the de-
fendants some of the largest companies in the country. Averbach
says: "[u]nless the case involves a palpable manufacturing de-
fect one can usually expect no offer of settlement beyond nuisance
value. . . .When one takes on a national manufacturer or retailer,
71. TNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
72. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607.
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he must proceed upon the assumption that he is going to trial. Few
cases, except the very simple ones, justify the outlay in time and
money usually required."7
Even before the complaint is filed, counsel must take care to
insure his ability to prove his case. The cardinal rule to be followed
in these cases is get possession of the defective product and keep
possession of it. 74 The advantage to the plaintiff lies in his ability
to investigate the product thoroughly, knowing that a claim can be
made while the defendant does not. This advantage and indeed the
entire case can be lost by an ignorant client or counsel who is too
accommodating. Averbach relates the case of Givens v. Baton Rouge
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 7 5 in which a woman had finished about half
a bottle of Coke when she allegedly discovered a worm in her mouth.
Her husband returned the bottle to the seller who sent it to the de-
fendant. Expert witnesses testified at the trial that there was nothing
wrong with the remainder of the product. The complaint was dismis-
sed and that decision was upheld on appeal. The moral of the case
is clear. If a decision cannot be reached between counsel as to how
the defendant might examine the evidence, they should resort to a
court order.
7 6
It should be assumed that in every product's liability case, the
advice and testimony of an expert witness will be needed. This is
true not only of the trial itself, but from the very beginning of the
suit. The expert is indispensible in helping counsel plan the case,
in suggesting alternate theories, providing questions for depositions
and, if necessary, supplying names of other experts.
77
In using an expert witness, two problems always encountered
are: (1) choosing an expert that can teach the jury and (2) school-
ing the expert in the ways of the law and the. use of his testimony.
These problems are encountered more in the use of university
professors and other more scholarly experts than with highly priced
specialists who are professional witnesses by trade.
The ideal expert is one who can easily explain complicated mech-
anical or chemical problems to the Jury in a common-sense manner.
An expert with glittering credentials, the teaching ability of a high
school instructor and the practical knowledge and language of a
mechanic is undoubtedly the best choice. As such a person probably
does not exist, counsel is left with choosing an expert nearer to one
type than the other. Here it should not be assumed that the creden-
73. 3B A. AVERBACH, HANDLING ACCTOENT CASE § 65 at 233, 234 (1971).
74. Id. at 235.
75. Givens v. Baton Rouge Coca Cola Bottling Co., 248 La. 904, 182 So. 2d 532 (1966).
76. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) provides that "[alny party may serve on any other party a
request (1) . . . to Inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things .. .
77. 3B A- AVERBACH, HANDLING ACCIDENT CAES 9 68 at 242 (1971).
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tials that dazzle the jury mark the best expert, particularly if the
trial is in a rural area. If the expert is unable to communicate,
he might as well stay in his office.
Depending upon how much court experience the expert has had,
he may have to be instructed on proper trial manners. The most
important thing is that the expert be made to see how unlike his
own education and knowledge the jury's is. Tozer points out the dif-
ficulty of converting ". . six retired mailmen and six bored house-
wives into. . . instant chemists or psychiatrists or pharmacists. 78
Finally, counsel must insist that the witness prepare for trial;
even the experienced expert's knowledge at trial should not be rusty.
Counsel should subject the expert to a thorough cross examination
before trial. Such a technique will sharpen the expert's use of his
own knowledge and prepare him for the rigors of the actual trial.
A second method of obtaining the "expert" assistance necessary
to the products liability suit is through the use of independent test-
ing laboratories and written reports. Compared to the use of the
expert witness alone, this method has two disadvantages: it is usually
more expensive and the expert is not present at all the stages of
the trial to advise counsel. The advantage of the independent labora-
tory is in the unbiased nature of the report. Consequently, it may
be more advisable for counsel defending a large corporation to use
this method rather than its own "in-house" experts.
Another type of proof particularly suited to the products liability
case is demonstrative evidence. Because it can be used to summarize
or illustrate a technical point in the expert's testimony, demonstra-
tive evidence is a helpful teaching aid for the jury.79 However, this
evidence must be used along with and not as a substitute for the
expert's testimony.
Almost every kind of demonstrative evidence has been held ad-
missible under the right conditions. Charts, diagrams, pictures both
still and moving, models and experiments are generally admissible
as long as the proper foundation is laid, usually by the expert.80
Generally, these foundations must show that:
(1) models are constructed to scale and that they accur-
ately represent the real item.
(2) pictures substantially reflect the conditions existing at
the accident.
(3) experiments are conducted under conditions similar to
those that existed when the accident took place.
78. Tozer, Preparation and Use of Technical Evidence in Products Liability Cases,
16 DEFENSE L.J. 669 (1967).
79. 3 L. FEUMER AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrT § 49.01 (1970).
80. See generally 3 L. FRUMER AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 49.02
(1970) ; 3 J. WIGMOR3, EVIMENCeH § 790 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970).
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In short, demonstrative evidence must be relevant and non-prej-
udicial.
All forms of demonstrative evidence have their particular draw-
backs, e.g., models that refuse to work in the court room and ex-
periments that backfire. These possibilities can only be weighed a-
gainst the usefulness and necessity of the presentation.
VI. PROOF OF PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
It will be remembered that in proving the plaintiff's case, cer-
tain elements are indispensable. The elements to be proved are:
(1) that the product was defective; (2) that the defect existed when
the product left the manufacturer; (3) that the defect caused the
plaintiff's injuries. These three elements are at the core of the prod-
ucts liability case and their proof is essential. Though it is usually
said that these elements can be proved by either direct or circum-
stantial evidence, Rheingold points out that circumstantial evidence
alone is used in the majority of cases."' He classifies this evidence
into categories that will be used here. Although the methods of
proof have been further classified here as to the three requirements
necessary for every case, this classification is for convenience only
and need not be rigidly applied. The proof methods (nature of the
product, life history, happening of the accident, etc.) can be inter-
changed depending upon the facts of the case.
A. PROOF OF DEFECT
1. Nature of the product
One of the first things that plaintiff's counsel might offer in proof
is the nature of the product itself. Here scientific analysis is indis-
pensable to show what it was in the product that caused the injury.
This method is particularly adapted to food and drink cases.82 In
Benavides v. Stop and Shop, Inc.8 8 , the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court entered a judgment for the seller of a soap product
which was alleged to have burned the plaintiff. The court found that
the plaintiff did not put into evidence either the soap used or a
chemical analysis of it.
Usually, proof that there was something in the defendant's prod-
uct that might have injured the plaintiff is insufficient. In Olano
v. Rex Milling Co. 4, evidence of ground glass in horse feed was
81. Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. Rzv. 325
(1971).
82. 2 L. FRUMER AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21.06[3] (1970').
83. Benavides v. Stop and Shop Inc., 346 Mass. 154, 190 N.E.2d 894 (1963).
84. Olano v. Rex Milling Co., 154 So. 2d 555 (La App. 1963).
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held to be insufficient as veterinary experts did not testify that the
glass had in fact caused the animal's death.
2. Life history of the product
A second type of evidence offered to prove the existence of a
defect is the history of the product. The plaintiff in an automobile
case, for example, might want to show that the car had had previous
difficulties similar to the one alleged to have caused the accident.
This kind of proof would be especially useful if the only occupant
of the car is killed and the vehicle is totally demolished. However,
a short or non-existent history can work either for or against the
plaintiff, tending to prove that the product was so new that no prob-
lem could have developed or by showing a lack of opportunity
to misuse or lack of intervening cause. s5
A manufacturer may wish to show the product's history as it
traveled through his plant as evidence of due care. Due care, of
course, is not at issue in strict liability and warranty cases, yet it
might well be asked how a manufacturer is going to prove the non-
existence of a defect except by showing how thorough his quality
control is. However it is used, life history will usually have to be
combined with other proof to constitute submissible proof of defect.8 6
3. The happening of the accident
In using the happening of the accident to prove a defect, much
of what has been said concerning the use of res ipsa to prove a
defect will apply. If the court will apply the loose interpretation of
the doctrine, it might well infer a defect from a case like Vanek s7
or Givens."" An important line of cases does exist, however, in which
nothing more than a malfunction was shown in order for the case
to go to the jury.89
4. Similar products and uses
Associated closely with the life history of a product, a plaintiff
may show a defect by presenting the history of other similar prod-
ucts. The Corvair serves as an example. Clearly, the similarity of
85. A safe history record, no matter how long, is always a helpful defense to a charge
of negligent liability, as it tends to show lack of notice of the defect in the product.
86. See Ilu Val v. Boos Bros. Cafeteria Co., 45 Cal. App. 377, 187 P. 767 (1919). In
Jurisdictions which allow the use of res ipsa loquitur or similar theories to prove defec-
tiveness of the product, life history evidence would normally be more useful to a plaintiff
than to a defendant.
87. See Vanek v. Kirby, 450 P.2d 778 (Ore. 1969).
88. See Givens v. Baton Rouge Coca Cola Bottling Co., 248 La. 904, 182 So.2d 532
(1966).
89. Franks v. National Dairy Products Corp., 414 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1969); Greco
v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 238 F. Supp. 978 (1967); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kil-
patrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 435 P.2d
806 (1967).
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the product is an issue. If a defective car came off the assembly
line the same day as the plaintiff's, then so much the better.
The use of a similar product by the defense is much the same
as the plaintiff's use. A safe record is relevant and admissible, on
the issue of a defect.9 0
Similarity in manufacturing or handling processes may also show
that a defect is built into a product or is repeatedly caused by mis-
handling. Rheingold 1 and other authorities92 correctly note however,
that in looking to the treatment of identical products of the same
manufacturer after the injury has occurred, courts have uniformly
excluded proof that the product has now been modified or improved
by the defendant. Yet exceptions to this rule have developed. 3
B. PROVING THE DEFECT EXISTED WHILE THE MANUFACTURER
CONTROLLED THE PRODUCT
This offer of proof is the one needed to bind a particular party
and will go toward satisfying the "exclusive control" requirement
of res ipsa loquitur. When the evidentiary thread is so weak that
no direct evidence is available, the inferences drawn from such
things as the nature of the product (e.g., a sealed container) are
not unlike those used in proving a defect by circumstantial evidence.
The common term applied to this phase of proof is "tracing,"
implying that the product must be followed through the hands of all
intermediaries to assess any contribution they may have made to
the product's defective condition. If investigative methods do not
prove fruitful, the only course left to the plaintiff may be to com-
mence an action and join all the intermediaries as defendants. Dis-
covery will normally result in denials that they caused any of the
defects. By a process of elimination, the only one left should be the
manufacturer.
C. THE DEFECT CAUSED THE INJURIES COMPLAINED OF
1. Elimination of other causes
Under any theory of liability, the plaintiff must prove both types
of causation after the defect has been found to exist. Though cau-
sation in fact and proximate cause are not the same thing, once
the plaintiff has proved causation in fact, he has probably proved
90. Becker v .American Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); as arso, 2
L. FRUMER AND M. FRIRDMAN, PRODUCTS LiAwLrry, § 16.03 [4] [iii] (1970).
91. See Rheingold, supra note 74.
92 2 J. WiaMonE, EVIDENCE § 283 (3rd ed. 1940); C. MCCORMICK, EviDENcm 543
(1954); 1 L. FRUmR AND M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS L[ABILTY § 12.04 (1971).
93. Christensen v. Powell, 236 Ore. 4.80, 389 P.2d 456 (1964) ; Citrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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proximate cause also.9 ' Proximate cause is usually proved by elimi.
nating other possible causes. This does not mean that other causes
must be eliminated absolutely, but only by the weight of probabili.
ties .9 5
In Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 9
the plaintiff complained that he had been injured when a sanding
disk manufactured by the defendant exploded in his face. The court
found insufficient evidence for a jury case saying:
While a manufacturer is liable on its warranty irrespective
of negligence, nevertheless it is necessary for the plaintiff
to show that the dangerous condition which he contends con-
stitutes a breach of warranty had its genesis when the in-
strumentality was within the control of the manufacturer.
Accordingly, in the absence of direct evidence that the prod-
uct is defective because of a manufacturing flaw or inade-
quate design, or other evidence which would permit an in-
ference that a dangerous condition existed prior to sale, it
is necessary to negate other causes of the failure of the prod-
uct for which the defendant would not be responsible, in or-
der to make it reasonable to infer that a dangerous condi-
tion existed at the time the defendant had control.
97
The view that injury following use is insufficient to prove prox-
imate cause is the view of most of the state courts, though an
opposite result has been reached in some food and beverage cases.
98
and some cases involving drugs and cosmetics.29
2. Occurrence of other injuries
Proof that other users of the same product have suffered injury
has been viewed as indicating, but not proving, proximate cause.
Likewise, proof that others have used the product and have not suf-
fered injury does not conclusively establish absence of proximate
cause. 100 Thus, proximate cause may be shown in spite of the fact
that other users did not suffer an injury.101
94. When proximate cause is lacking in a products liability case it will usually take
the form of one of the following defenses: the purchaser knew of the defect but used
the product anyway; the purchaser used the product In a way unintended by the nanu-
facturer; the risk was not forseeable. 1 L. FRUMER AND M. FRiEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrm
§ 11.02, at 210.6 (1971).
95. 1 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LiAnILITY § 1:21 (1961).
96. Jakubowski v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964). Rhein-
gold correctly notes that this case and other similar ones do not require the plaintiff to
eliminate other causes in every case. It is more likely that the court will require this
when the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence.
97. Id. at 829.
98. Campbell v. Safeway Stores Inc., 149 A.2d 420 (Mun. Ct. APp. Dist. Col. 1959).
99. Bundy v. Ey-Teb. Inc., 160 Misc. 325, 289 N.Y.S. 905 (New York City Ct. 1935).
100. Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus. Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681, 685
(1964).
101. MacLean v. Loft Candy Stores Inc., 172 So. 367 (La. App. 1937).
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It is worthwhile at this point to repeat what was said earlier
about the use of these proof methods: They need not be rigidly ap-
plied. That is, all of the methods mentioned might, depending upon
the particular set of facts, be used to prove a defect. In another
case only two might be usable to prove a defect, with the others
going to show that the defendant had control of the article when
the defect was introduced. In this last respect they are interchange-
able to the degree that proof can be accomplished by circumstance
and inference.10 2
It should be apparent from what has been said in this section
on the proof of the case that in the normal products liability case,
it "is not one inference but many inferences and circumstances
that must be considered. . . each to cover some necessary point
of the proof."' 03
VII. CONCLUSION
It is not difficult to discern from the history of the law of prod-
ucts liability that the consumer is gaining an ever-increasing edge
over the makers and suppliers of articles that cause him injury.
The changing social and judicial attitudes that are widening the duty
of the suppliers of the dangerous product through such mechanisms
as strict liability, can be expected to have a number of effects on
the pleading and proof of the case. As social and legal "sympathy"
for the consumer grows, it can be expected that plaintiffs will find
it easier to get past the pleading stages with more general allega-
tions of defect as was seen in Vanek, and that plaintiffs will be
able to meet their burden of proof with weaker or at least more
indirect evidence. It also seems likely that as the application of
strict liability continues to grow, the use of the common law warranty
theory will be reduced, helping to eliminate some of the confusion
in the substantive law.
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102. Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 238 F. Supp. 978, 407 l.2d 87 (1969).
103. See Rheingold, anpra note 74, at 342.
